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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEW STATE 
CITIZENS: AN UPDATE 
William Cohen* 
Ten years ago, the first article in Volume 1, Number 1, of 
Constitutional Commentary was my brief analysis of a decade of 
confusing cases dealing with discrimination against new state citi-
zens.l In responding to the editors' request that I participate in 
the anniversary issue, it seemed only natural to try to bring my 
earlier effort up to date. 
Most cases held that it was unconstitutional for states to dis-
criminate against new citizens. The problem lay in the bewilder-
ing and inconsistent explanations for those outcomes. Shapiro v. 
Thompsonz began the process by concluding that denying wel-
fare benefits to new citizens interfered with their constitutional 
right to free migration. Dunn v. Blumstein,3 dealing with dura-
tiona! residency requirements for voting, and Memorial Hospital 
v. Maricopa County,4 invalidating a durational residency re-
quirement for free medical services to the indigent, explained 
that the issue was not whether new citizens were in fact deterred 
from migration, but whether denial of a state benefit was a "pen-
alty" for recent migration. Maricopa County stated that a dura-
tiona! residency requirement was an unconstitutional penalty if 
the benefit denied was a "basic necessity of life." Vlandis v. 
Klines invalidated a state law that made new citizens enrolling in 
state universities permanently ineligible for the lower tuition 
charged state citizens. The rationale ignored claims of discrimi-
nation against new citizens, and rested on the denial of a hearing 
to determine actual citizenship. Zobel v. Williams6 invalidated 
an Alaska scheme that distributed state oil income depending on 
* C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford University. Re-
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1. William Cohen, Equal Treatment for Newcomers: The Core Meaning of National 
and State Citizenship, 1 Const. Comm. 9 (1984). 
2. 394 u.s. 618 (1969). 
3. 405 u.s. 330 (1972). 
4. 415 u.s. 250 (1974). 
5. 412 U.S. 441 (1974). 
6. 457 u.s. 55 (1982). 
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length of residence.7 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the 
Court applied what purported to be a "minimum rationality" 
standard of equal protection. While the opinion concluded that a 
state objective to award longer residents for their past contribu-
tions was not legitimate, it left open the question whether other 
possible state interests were legitimate, and whether "more rigor-
ous scrutiny" was in order when the state discriminated against 
new residents. 
The cases that permitted denial of benefits to new citizens 
were also confusing. Vlandis v. Kline stated, in dictum, that new 
state citizens could be charged higher tuition in state universities 
for the first year. The explanation was the relatively uncon-
troversial proposition that a reasonable durational residence re-
quirement was an appropriate method to insure that only bona 
fide state citizens claimed the lower tuition.s Sosna v. Iowa,9 
which upheld an Iowa law barring new citizens from the divorce 
courts, could have been sustained on the same rationale. Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, however, suggested that a 
wide range of state policies-here Iowa's concern to avoid be-
coming a "divorce mill"-could sustain durational residency re-
quirements for state benefits extended to state citizens. 
I argued ten years ago that the doctrinal confusion of the 
cases demanded a better explanation, one grounded in the Citi-
zenship Clause of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One aspect of full sovereignty denied to the states is the power 
to determine membership in the community. Under the four-
teenth amendment, any United States citizen becomes a full-
fledged member of the state community immediately upon es-
tablishing residence there. . . . A state's decision that old-tim-
ers deserve a greater share of state-owned resources cannot be 
squared with a constitutional structure that demands that new-
comers be treated as full members of the state community.lo 
I argued, from this premise, that no competing substantive state 
policies could justify a decision to deny newcomers an equal 
share of state benefits. A durational residency requirement 
7. Each citizen eighteen years old or older received one share for each year of 
residency since 1959, the year of Alaska statehood. 
8. 412 U.S. at 452. The Court relied on the summary ruling in Starns v. Malkerson, 
401 U.S. 985 (1971), affirming 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970). Another summary af-
firmance of a case sustaining a durational residency requirement for payment of in-state 
tuition at a state university was Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973), affirming 368 
F. Supp. 38 (W.O. Wash. 1973). 
9. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
10. 1 Const. Comm. at 17 (cited in note 1). 
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should only be sustained when a benefit can constitutionally be 
limited to a state's own citizens and when the requirement is a 
reasonable test of bona fide residence. I argued, finally, that the 
pattern of decisions lined up exactly with these principles, even if 
the stated rationales did not. Although Sosna purported to rest 
on other grounds, it could be explained by Iowa's concern that 
otherwise its divorce processes would be invoked by "non-citi-
zens physically present in the state for a brief period. "11 The 
proposition that durational residency requirements are invalid 
except insofar as they respond to a reasonable concern for proof 
of domiciliary intent "is a cleaner inquiry than the ones suggested 
by present doctrine, and would place the constitutional right of 
equal state citizenship in its proper perspective. "12 
In the intervening ten years, very little has changed. Three 
additional cases have, over substantial dissent, disapproved state 
laws treating new and old citizens unequally.tJ Two cases dealt 
with veterans' preferences. Hooper v. Bernali/lo14 struck down a 
New Mexico law that granted a tax exemption to Vietnam veter-
ans only if they resided in the state before May 8, 1976. Chief 
Justice Burger's opinion followed the same path as his Zobel 
opinion, concluding that the distinction between eligible and 
non-eligible veterans violated equal protection because "the stat-
utory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality test." 
Zobel was cited for the proposition that "the Constitution will 
not tolerate a state benefit program that 'creates fixed, perma-
nent distinctions ... between ... classes of concededly bona fide 
residents, based on how long they have been in the State.'" Jus-
tice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, 
argued that there was a "rational" justification. New Mexico 
could have awarded all Vietnam veterans living in the state a 
lump sum bonus in 1976, without being required to provide addi-
tional bonuses later to new arrivals. The tax exemption, although 
it continued into the future, operated in much the same fashion.ts 
11. ld. at 19. 
12. Id. 
13. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Attorney General of 
New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985). 
14. 472 u.s. 612 (1985). 
15. There was a timing problem in Hooper. But if the majority ignored it, Justice 
Stevens oversimplified it. A state need not share state-owned resources with non-citizens. 
If a state were to give a cash bonus to resident veterans upon their induction into service, 
veterans who moved to the state after discharge could not complain they had been denied 
the bonus. If, however, the state is allowed to fix a past date as the qualifying residency 
date for future benefits, the door is open for the state to draw distinctions between old 
and new citizens for the disbursement of present benefits. 
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Moreover, newly arrived veterans denied the tax exemption were 
treated like the great majority of state citizens who were ineligi-
ble for the benefit. 
The same 6-3 division split the Justices in the other veterans' 
benefit case one year later-Attorney General of New York v. 
Soto-Lopezt6-but produced new doctrinal arguments. The 
Court struck down a New York law that limited a veterans' civil 
service preference to veterans who resided in New York when 
they entered military service. Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
White followed Zobel and Hooper, arguing that the denial of the 
veterans' preference to new residents failed the equal protection 
rational basis standard. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, how-
ever, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, relied 
on the "penalty" rationale of Dunn and Maricopa County, con-
cluding that "even temporary deprivations of very important 
benefits and rights can operate to penalize migration." As in 
Hooper, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Stevens dissented. 
The third case dealing with discrimination against new citi-
zens involved a complicated Vermont statute providing an ex-
emption from payment of use taxes for automobiles purchased in 
other states. The exemption was available only for persons who 
were Vermont residents when they purchased the automobile. 
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Williams v. Vermontl7 
held that the different treatment of new and old Vermont resi-
dents flunked the rational basis equal protection standard. There 
was "no relevant difference between motor vehicle registrants 
who purchased their cars out-of-state while they were Vermont 
residents and those who only came to Vermont after buying a car 
elsewhere." Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor 
dissented. 
Ten years ago, there was some reason to hope that the Court 
would provide a reasoned, unitary explanation for the outcomes 
in this area of constitutional law. There is less reason today. The 
Court continues to leave undefined the constitutional interest 
served by protecting new citizens from discrimination, and treats 
the question as one requiring an ad hoc balance between infinite 
competing interests. 
The doctrinal uncertainty is likely to come to the surface in 
states that have recently tried to limit the welfare benefits 
awarded to new arrivals. Shapiro established that states cannot 
deny all welfare benefits to new arrivals. Instead, a number of 
16. 476 U.S. 898 (1986). 
17. 472 u.s. 14 (1985). 
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states facing budget crises have limited new citizens to the wel-
fare benefits they would have received in their states of origin. 
In 1970, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rendered an advisory 
opinion that limiting welfare payments to those in the state of 
origin for the first two years of Massachusetts residence would be 
inconsistent with Shapiro.ts 1\venty-three years later, courts 
have struggled with a more complex doctrinal structure when 
they considered similar legislation. A federal district court has 
held unconstitutional the California statutei9 limiting AFDC 
benefits to the level of those in the state of origin for the first 
year of California residence.2o Most recently, the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota invalidated a statute21 reducing general assistance 
grants for the first six months of Minnesota residence to the 
greater of sixty percent of the normal grant, or the amount the 
recipient would have received in the state of origin.22 In both 
cases state officials predictably argued that Shapiro and Mari-
copa County were inapplicable because new residents were not 
denied all benefits, and had not had their benefits reduced be-
cause they migrated. Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez were dis-
tinguished as involving permanent denial of benefits to new 
residents. Both courts rejected the arguments, and concluded 
that, whether or not the partial temporary denials of benefits ac-
tually deterred interstate migration, they were unconstitutional 
"penalties." 
The states' arguments were accepted by the dissenting Jus-
tice in the Minnesota Supreme Court. Justice Tomljanovich ar-
gued that, because the right to travel was not "penalized," the 
appropriate standard of review was the rational basis test of the 
lowest tier of equal protection analysis under which welfare eligi-
bility standards are nearly-uniformly upheld.23 Similar argu-
ments were adopted last year by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
which upheld a sixty-day waiting period for grants of general 
assistance.24 The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted the "unsettled 
nature of the degree to which a durational residency requirement 
must impinge upon the right to travel to be unconstitutional," 
and that "the parameters of Shapiro's penalty analysis ... remain 
18. Opinion of the Justices, 257 N.E.2d 94 (1970). 
19. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1993). 
20. Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993). 
21. Minn. Stat. § 2560.065 (1992). 
22. Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993). 
23. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970). 
24. Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992). 
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undefined." The court justified the waiting period as advancing a 
number of substantive state interests, including encouraging em-
ployment and avoiding discrimination against families of the 
working poor. 
It is less than clear with whom the Supreme Court, as pres-
ently constituted, will agree. The Court has not spoken to the 
issue since 1986. The only three Justices who were in the major-
ity in all cases striking down discrimination against new state citi-
zenszs are gone. The Chief Justice has consistently voted to 
uphold all distinctions between old and new state residents. 
Three Justices dissented in one, two, or all three of the most re-
cent cases.z6 The five remaining Justices have not participated in 
any Supreme Court decision touching the issue of discrimination 
against new state citizens.27 It is possible that the Court will use 
minimum scrutiny, as in Zobel, Hooper, and Williams. Viewing 
the issue that way, it would be easy to characterize the problem, 
as did Justice Tomljanovich and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to 
be simply part of the "intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance 
programs. "zs 
These should be easy cases. They are not because they have 
been viewed through the Byzantine lens of equal protection doc-
trine,z9 and not as a straightforward application of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause. A comparison with 
another application of that Clause will help to illustrate my argu-
ment. California's Governor, Pete Wilson, recently urged that 
citizenship be denied to children of undocumented aliens born in 
the United States.Jo The Governor recognized, however, that no 
state or federal statute could deny these children their United 
States citizenship. Whatever the strength of competing state in-
25. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White. 
26. Justice Blackmun dissented in Williams. Justice Stevens dissented in Hooper 
and Soto·Lopez. Justice O'Connor dissented in all three cases. 
27. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. 
28. 485 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487). Justice Coyne reluc-
tantly concurred in the Minnesota decision only because she read Supreme Court prece-
dents to compel that outcome. She argued, however, that the Minnesota statute was 
"simply [ J neutral with respect to the right to travel." She concluded that there was "no 
earthly reason for limiting a state's option to the total discontinuance of general assist-
ance or of risking financial ruin." 504 N.W.2d at 211. 
29. See William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a Surrogate 
for Other Rights, 59 Thl. L. Rev. 884 (1985); William Cohen, Federalism in Equality Cloth-
ing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1 
(1985); William Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny Pitts-
burgh Coal Company v. County Commission, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 87 (1990). 
30. Seeking to Deny Citizenship to Some, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1993, at A10. 
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terests, the Citizenship Clause states simply that all persons born 
in the United States are citizens. Moreover, just as surely as it 
would violate the Constitution to deny these children their citi-
zenship, it would violate the Constitution to concede their citi-
zenship in name only while treating them as if they were 
undocumented aliens. 
The other provision of the Citizenship Clause is equally 
clear. United States citizens become citizens of the states 
wherein they reside. There are no waiting periods. And, just as 
it would violate the Constitution to deny these new arrivals state 
citizenship, it would violate the Constitution to concede their citi-
zenship in name only while treating them as if they were still citi-
zens of other states. That should mean that it is unconstitutional 
to deny benefits to new citizens that are extended to other citi-
zens similarly situated-subject only to reasonable assurances 
that claims of new residence are bona fide. 
